INTRODUCTION
Technology-based entrepreneurial ventures are a prominent means through which jobs, innovations and new technologies are created (e.g., Audretsch, 1995) . Some of the key choices and decisions that an entrepreneurial venture makes during its evolution are reflected in its business model, that is, the way that the venture expects to create and capture value from its underlying technology (Teece, 2010) . Because it involves decisions related to the system of activities the venture will undertake (Amit & Zott, 2001 ) and its revenue generation mechanism (Teece, 2010) , the business model that a venture chooses can have important implications for its growth and performance (George & Bock, 2011; Zott & Amit, 2007; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Patzelt , Knyphausen-Aufsess, & Nikol, 2008) . Despite their salience in a venture's evolution, business models have only recently begun attracting scholarly attention (Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011) .
Traditionally, technology-based entrepreneurial ventures have focused on creating value through closed business models in which the locus of innovation and the system of activities are concentrated within the venture's boundaries and revenue generation occurs by creating isolating mechanisms via intellectual property rights to achieve monopoly rents (Barney, 1991) . However, increasing competition and cost of product development have led more and more ventures to open up their innovation processes and adopt "open" business models (Chesbrough, 2006) which have two distinctive features. First, open business models involve creating value through greater utilization of external knowledge sources such that the locus of innovation and the system of activities undertaken by the venture extend outside its boundaries (Chesbrough, 2006) . Second, because creating synergies between external and internal knowledge sources requires ventures to engage in selective revealing (Henkel, 2009; Alexy & George, 2013) , ventures are not able to rely on intellectual property rights as the primary means of generating revenues (Casadesus-Masanell & Llanes, 2011) . Even though adopting open buisiness model may help ventures in creating value through increasing innovative performance (Laursen & Salter, 2006) , cutting costs (Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003) , and improving the quality of products (Chesbrough, 2003) , these benefits are accompanied by greater complexity in the system of activities which has implications for the viability and sustainability of the revenue (Berger &Udell, 1998; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Hall, 2002; Hall & Lerner, 2012) . VC investors are able to carefully scrutinize entrepreneurial ventures before investing and closely monitor them after the investment (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Gompers & Lerner, 1999) .
They also add value to portfolio firms through coaching and the access to their network of business contacts (Sapienza & Timmons, 1989; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007) . Lastly, VC investments provide a quality signal making it easier for portfolio firms to collect additional resources from uninformed third parties (Megginson &Weiss, 1991) . Accordingly, VC investments have been shown to have a strong positive effect on various measures of venture performance, such as successful exits (Hsu, 2006) , Total Factor Productivity and sales growth (Bertoni, Colombo, & Grilli, 2011;  Chemmanur, Krishnan, & Nandy, 2011) .
Prior literature provides some qualitative evidence that the business model adopted by entrepreneurial ventures to commercialize their technology is an important aspect that influences selection by VC investors (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004) . However, the link between entrepreneurial ventures' business model and VC finance has not been adequately investigated. To fill this gap, we compare VC-backed entrepreneurial ventures that have adopted an open source software (OSS) business model as an example of an open business model (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007) with VCbacked entrepreneurial ventures that develop and sell proprietary software, an example of a closed business model. Given this context, we ask the following related questions: Does the adoption of an OSS business model make entrepreneurial ventures more likely to obtain finance from higher quality VC investors? Are VC investors financing OSS entrepreneurial ventures more likely to resort to syndication and to more frequent staging of VC investments?
Our insights are as follow. OSS entrepreneurial ventures face greater complexity and uncertainty in their system of activities and revenue generation model than their proprietary software counterparts, and consequently, the OSS business model suffers significantly from a lack of legitimacy. Therefore, the superior coaching, monitoring and networking abilities of higher quality VC investors are especially valuable for OSS entrepreneurial ventures, as is the strong quality signal that their investments convey. In addition, because of the greater uncertainty that surrounds the OSS business model, higher quality VC investors which have greater risk tolerance, are more inclined to invest in these firms than their lower quality peers. For the same reasons we also expect VC investments in OSS entrepreneurial ventures to be more likely to be syndicated and to be more frequently staged.
To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of 514 North American VC-backed software entrepreneurial ventures obtained from SDC Platinum (VentureXpert), which received the first round of VC finance in the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Of these entrepreneurial ventures, 124 adopted an OSS business model, while the remaining entrepreneurial ventures adopted a proprietary software business model. The final sample consists of 6,555 venture -VC dyads, each of which reflects an investment made by a VC in a portfolio venture. 2,029 of these dyads are comprised of an OSS entrepreneurial venture. Our results indicate that VC investors that invest in OSS entrepreneurial ventures are of significantly higher quality than those that invest in proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures. We also observe that OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive a greater number of rounds of VC finance.
However, we do not detect any difference between OSS and proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures in terms of the syndication activity of VCs that invest in such ventures. Our results are robust to several robustness checks we performed to control for possible biases in our results.
The contributions of our study are twofold. First, the study addresses a significant gap in the literature on business models and VC financing. In doing so, we respond to the calls by Alexy and George (2013) for further investigation on open business models and different sources of financing. Alexy and George (2013) showed that adopting open business models impacts the value of public firms. We complement the results of their study by focusing on privately held ventures and investigating type of VC financing they are able to attract. Business models are commonly linked to survival and long-term performance of entrepreneurial ventures (George & Bock, 2011) . Simialrly, the ability to access high quality VC financing increases chances of survival and success of entrepreneurial ventures (Nahata, 2008; Sorensen, 2007) . In this study we have shown that entrepreneurial ventures that adopt an open business model are able to to acquire high quality VC financing, which in turn, augments the sustainability and viability of the business model in the long run.
Second, we contribute to the literature on VC financing of entrepreneurial ventures. The literature on VC quality, staging, and syndication focused on the role of uncertainty (Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Altintig, Chiu, & Goktan, 2013; Tian &Wang, 2011; Petkova, Wadhwa, Yao, & Jain, 2013; Li, 2008; Bygrave, 1987; Casamatta & Haritchabalet 2007; Wang & Zhou, 2004) . While prior research has highlighted the importance of business model in VC financing (e.g. Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004) , empirical studies treat entrepreneurial ventures as homogenous entities with respect to their business models. In this study we highlight the uncertainties associated with adopting an open business model and show how choice of the business model and uncertainties associated with it affect VC quality, staging, and syndication.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contrasts the OSS business model with the proprietary software business model and develops the theoretical hypotheses of this study. Section 3 describes the sample and the data collection process, defines the variables and outlines the methodology used for analyzing the data. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis and section 5 discusses the conclusions.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES The Managerial Challenges of the OSS Business Model
In this paper, we define the business model as the way a firm operates to "create and deliver value to customers" (Teece, 2010: 173) . In accordance with previous studies on the topic, we contrast the OSS business model with the proprietary software business model by focusing on the two main dimensions of a business model: the system of activities and the revenue generation mechanism (Amit & Zott, 2001; Zott et al., 2011) .
Entrepreneurial ventures adopting a proprietary software business model rely on IPRs combined with other appropriability mechanisms (e.g. brand, lead time) to protect the software they develop from imitation, and sell licenses of the machine-code (which is inintelligble to a human being) to capture the value generated by this software. In other words, the revenue generation model of proprietary software ventures is based on the exploitation of a (temporary) monopoly rent generated by their proprietary technology. Proprietary software ventures may collaborate with third parties (e.g., universities, other firms), but their system of activities is centered on their internal R&D and value creation and is closely dependent on the human capital of their talented employees who work as software programmers.
Conversely, entrepreneurial ventures embracing an OSS business model leverage the software code and technological knowledge produced and made freely available by the community of OSS developers. The core of the system of activities of OSS entrepreneurial ventures is thus constituted by collaborations with OSS developers: through them OSS ventures get access to technological knowledge and competencies which otherwise they could not acquire or develop internally (Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli, & Rossi, 2006; Piva, Rentocchini, & Rssi-Lamastra, 2012) . In the OSS realm, IPRs are designed for favoring instead of forbidding the access by third parties (e.g., (Gruber & Henkel, 2006) . Hence, the revenues of OSS ventures cannot directly come from selling OSS code. The revenue generation model of OSS firms is instead based on the sale of products (software, and hardware) or services that leverage the OSS resources (Perr, Appleyard, & Sullivan, 2010) .
In particular, the revenue generation models of OSS entrepreneurial ventures can be grouped into two distinct, though conceptually similar, categories. First, OSS ventures may resort to versioning (Shapiro & Varian, 1998) ; while they give away for free a basic version of an OSS software, they also sell a proprietary premium version of that software, which includes advanced features and is targeted to less price sensitive customers. Examples of this revenue generation model are provided by MySQL and Sleepycat (Goldman & Gabriel, 2005; Perr et al., 2010) . The former venture builds on the open source MySQL project which is freely available and monetize on MySQL Pro Server to those who need to redistribute applications (Perr et al., 2010 (Perr et al., 2010) .
OSS ventures relying on versioning take advantage of the direct and indirect network externalities generated by the diffusion of the basic OSS version (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Gandal, 1995) . First, the greater is the number of users of the basic version, the more the basic version is tested and the more feedback is provided to OSS developers, thus improving the quality of both the basic and premium versions of the software. Second, as the number of users of the basic version increases, it becomes possible for customers who buy the premium version to exchange files and knowledge with a larger crowd. Third, the more widespread the diffusion of the basic version, the greater the incentives for OSS developers to produce applications compatible with the basic version. To the extent that these applications are also compatible with the premium version, they increase the value to customers of the premium version.
Second, OSS ventures can generate revenues from selling products or services that are complementary to one (or more) OSS solution(s) made available for free by the OSS community. A prominent example of this revenue generation model is provided by Red Hat, which monetizes on providing support and updates for the Linux operating system whose code is freely available on the Internet. Other ventures use the Linux operating system in combination with proprietary hardware 1 Open Source Initiative devices like mobile phones and machine controls (Gruber & Henkel, 2006) . LynuxWorks and MontaVista are examples of these ventures.The fact that the OSS solutions are free of charge reduces the price that OSS ventures can charge for the complementary products and services, thereby increasing their demand. In addition, the free availability of the OSS solutions favors their diffusion and makes them more valuable to customers because of the direct and indirect network externalities typical of the software realm (Katz & Shapiro, 1985) . This further increases the value to the customers of the complementary products and services. Obviously, this revenue generation model is viable provided that complementary products and services are sold in an imperfectly competitive market (Fosfuri, Giarratana, & Luzzi, 2008) . This happens when an OSS venture controls unique assets that are difficult to replicate for potential competitors and confers it an advantage in the market of the complementary products and services (Teece, 1986) . Examples of these assets include ownership of the hardware technology or commercial assets, like a reputed brand or an effective sale force.
The core intuition of this paper is that the OSS business model poses severe challenges relating to both the system of activities and the revenue generation mechanisms. Hence, the returns generated by an OSS business model are more uncertain than those generated by a proprietary software business model.
As regards the system of activities, OSS ventures' collaborations with OSS developers are far from simple because these firms do not have the full control of the OSS development process (O'Mahony & Bechky, 2008; Colombo & Rossi-Lamastra, 2013; Dahlander & Magnusson, 2008) . The OSS community is potentially open to everybody. While some OSS developers are eager to signal their talent by developing high-quality software with the aim of obtaining a better job, others write OSS code just for fun and are less committed to quality (von Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth, & Wallin, 2012; Lerner & Tirole, 2002) . Moreover, while OSS developers may receive monetary compensation from OSS ventures for their OSS development activities, these activities are usually not ruled by formal contracts and OSS developers are not employees of the OSS projects to which they contribute (O'Mahony, 2002; Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005 
Research Hypotheses
In the previous section, we have argued that OSS business models are more complex and surrounded by greater uncertainty than proprietary software business models. This is especially troublesome for OSS ventures which require external financing for scaling up their business, as they need to commit to providing a road map and precise milestones so as to be able to attract investors 4 . In this section, we develop a set of theoretical hypotheses relating to the implications for VC financing of the adoption by software firms of an OSS business model. In particular, we argue that because of the greater complexity and uncertainty of the OSS business model, OSS ventures will more likely match with high quality VC investors 5 than their counterparts that adopt a proprietary software business model. Moreover, we contend that VC investments in OSS ventures will be more likely to be staged and syndicated than VC invesments in proprietary software firms.
VC quality. Scholars in entrepreneurial finance agree that VC investors not only provide capital to entrepreneurial ventures, but also add value to them (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Gompers & Lerner, 1999) . High quality VC investors add even more value than other VC investors through three mechanisms. First, high quality VC investors provide better monitoring and coaching. Second, they give entrepreneurial ventures access to a larger network of suppliers, potential customers and candidate executives (Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Hochberg et al., 2007) . Third, backing
by a high quality VC investor certifies the high quality of the entrepreneurial venture to uninformed third parties, thereby making it easier for the entrepreneurial venture to obtain access to additional financial and non-financial resources (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) . In accordance with this view, previous studies have found a positive association between the quality of VC investors and the performance of their portfolio firms, as reflected by the probability of getting an additional round of financing (Hochberg et al., 2007) , the probability of subsequent successful exit through an IPO and/or a trade sale (Hochberg et al., 2007; Sorensen, 2007; Nahata, 2008) , and several measures of long-run post-IPO firm performance (Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, & Singh, 2011; Chou, Cheng, & Chien, 2013) . Therefore, in the search for VC financing, entrepreneurial ventures struggle to attract high quality VC investors (Hsu, 2004) . In support of this argument, (Hsu, 2004) found that offers by high quality VC investors are three times more likely to be accepted by entrepreneurial ventures. Moreover, entrepreneurial venture in order to attract high quality VC investors are willing to offer their equity with a 10-14% discount to higher quality VCs.
Previous studies also showed that VC investors add relatively more value to entrepreneurial ventures which have more complex operations and face greater uncertainty, for instance because they are in an early stage (Sapienza & Timmons, 1989; Timmons & Bygrave, 1986) or are more involved in innovation (Sapienza, 1992; Hellmann & Puri 2000; Tian & Wang 2011) .
Following this line of reasoning, we expect high quality VC investors to add greater value to entrepreneurial ventures that adopt an OSS business model as compared to ventures that adopt a proprietary software business model. First, the difficulties faced by OSS entrepreneurial ventures in the design and implementation of their business model make the coaching provided by high quality VC investors more valuable for these firms than for proprietary software firms. In particular, high quality VC investors can provide fundamental inputs to design the sophisticated revenue generation mechanisms on which OSS entrepreneurial ventures rely. Moreover, high quality VC investors can help OSS entrepreneurial ventures hire professional managers specialized in community colllaboration, thereby improving their system of activities. Alternatively, owner-managers of OSS entrepreneurial ventures backed by high quality VC investors may specialize in managing collaborations with the OSS community, while delegating other managerial tasks to newly hired professional managers. Second, the OSS business model suffers from a lack of legitimacy 6 as a reliable business model, as it involves actions (e.g., release of software source code to the OSS community) that represent a radical departure from the traditional approach to creating and appropriating value from software development (Alexy & George, 2013) . This effect is amplified by the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the OSS business model, and the fact that the free software movement from which OSS was originated, have an anti-business ideology (Stallman, 1984) .
Hence, being associated with high quality VC investors is more valuable for OSS entrepreneurial ventures than for their proprietary software counterparts, because the quality signal that backing by a high quality VC investor conveys to uninformed third parties clearly is more important for firms that lack legitimacy.
In sum, high quality VC investors add more value to OSS ventures than they do to proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures. Hence, the former firms can offer high quality VC investors equity at conditions that cannot be matched by the latter firms. Moreover, since the OSS business model requires inputs which low quality VC investors are unlikely to provide, these latter investors are quite unattractive for OSS entrepreneurial ventures and will self-select into entrepreneurial ventures with a less challenging proprietary software business model.
A final consideration is on order. High quality VC investors are likely to be less risk averse than low quality VC investors, as their reputation allows them to raise funds despite the possible disastrous performance of some portfolio companies (Gompers, 1996) . Accordingly, high quality VC investors will be more prone to invest in high risk/high return entrepreneurial ventures (Petkova et al., 2013) . The higher risk aversion of low quality VC investors further contributes to make OSS entrepreneurial ventures less attractive to them than to high quality VC investors. Overall, the aforementioned arguments suggest the following:
H1: The quality of VC investors that finance OSS entrepreneurial ventures is higher than the quality of VC investors that finance proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures.
Investment staging and syndication. Staging is the stepwise provision of several rounds of VC finance to entrepreneurial ventures rather than making an upfront investment of all required capital (Sahlman, 1990) . Staging offers two main advantages to VC investors (Gompers, 1995; Wang & Zhou, 2004) . First, the agency costs engendered by the opportunistic behavior of entrepreneurs are mitigated as the VC investor keeps the option to abandon the venture if the venture fails to meet the milestones set for it. Second, staging creates a real option for the VC investor to stop financing the entrepreneurial venture at each financing round. It allows the VC investor to learn about the entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial venture's operations over time and use the information acquired between each round to make better investment decisions (Bergemann & Hege, 1998) .
The extent of agency costs and the value of the exit option provided to VC investors by staging increase with the the uncertainty that surrounds the portfolio firm, thus making staging more valuable (Li, 2008) . In accordance with this view, Gompers (1995) showed that lower industry ratios of tangible assets to total assets, higher market-to-book ratios, and greater R&D intensities are associated with more frequent staging. In a similar vein, Tian (2011) found a positive association between the geographical distance between the entrepreneurial venture and the lead VC investor and the likelihood that the VC would stage the investment. Indeed, when distance is greater, collecting information about the entrepreneurial venture is more costly for the VC investor, monitoring is less effective because of lack of relevant information, and so both agency costs and the value of the exit option are greater. It has been also shown that VC investments in younger firms are also more likely to be staged. (Bertoni et al., 2013) .
syndication allows syndicate members to share the risk of the syndicated investments. Hence, they can reduce the total risk of their investment portfolio through diversification of the investments (Bygrave, 1987) . Second, syndication improves selection of investments, as the quality of target entrepreneurial ventures is evaluated separately and double checked by syndicate members (Lerner, 1994; Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007) . Third, to the extent that syndicate members have heterogeneous skills, specialization, and network linkages, they can provide more effective coaching to entrepreneurial ventures than individual VC investors, helping them enlarge their resources and capabilities (Tian, 2012) .
The available empirical evidence supports the above arguments. Using Canadian data at VC investment level, Brander et al. (2002) showed that syndicated VC investments have higher average returns and higher variability than stand-alone investments. Altintig et al. (2013) 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY Data
To build the sample of firms analyzed in the present paper, we first considered VC-backed software entrepreneurial ventures 8 included in the SDC Platinum (former VentureXpert) database which met the following criteria: i) they were located in the North America (USA and Canada); ii) they received their first round of VC investment in the period 1994-2008, and iii) they were 10 years old or younger at the time of the first VC round. 4336 companies met these three criteria.
In order to detect OSS entrepreneurial ventures, we resorted to three different sources. First,
following O'Mahony (2002) and Dahlander (2007), we examined the business descriptions provided by VentureXpert. 14 ventures turned out to have adopted an OSS business model. We identify these ventures by searching for the words "open source" in the business description and after reading it, the ones that clearly referred to entrepreneurial ventures developing OSS were labeled as OSS entrepreneurial ventures. Second, we added to this group the 67 entrepreneurial ventures that were mentioned in "The 451 group" reports (Aslett, 2009; Aslett, 2010) as OSS ventures. Aslett (2009 Aslett ( , 2010 provide an insight about OSS entrepreneurial ventures which were able to receive VC investment in the period of 1997-2010. Among approximately 130 ventures mentioned in the reports, we were able to identify 67 of them which are included in the sample extracted from SDC. In this sample, 11 ventures were mentioned also in VentureXpert. Third, in accordance with the procedure used by (Fosfuri et al., 2008) , we extracted from the Gale Group PROMT and ASAP databases all articles about new product announcements 9 that met the following criteria: i) the article was published in the period 1994-2011, ii) it referred to the SIC code 7372 (software), and iii) it included one or more of the following words: "Open source", "OSS", "FLOSS (free libre open source software)", "Linux", "Apache", or "free software". We extracted about 1500 product announcements. In order to classify a product announcement as relating to an OSS company, all of the extracted announcements were carefully read by a trained research assistant and checked by one of the authors. In this way, we selected 54 additional companies. Altogether, we identified 124 OSS companies. 10 This group includes entrepreneurial ventures which received scholarly and public attention such as SugarCRM, Red Hat Inc, JasperSoft Corporation, and SpikeSource, Inc.
In order to build a control group composed of proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures, we considered all software product announcements extracted from the Gale Group PROMT and ASAP databases which met the above mentioned criteria. Then we searched in these documents for the name of the remaining 4,212 VentureXpert companies while excluding the 124 companies identified as OSS companies. To be sure these ventures do not have any OSS product we manually read the documents.
In this way, we were able to identify 390 proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures 11 .
The final sample includes 514 software entrepreneurial ventures which received VC investment from 1,035 unique VC firms. The analysis is at the dyad level. We consider the 6,555
dyads that correspond to an investment by VC firm i in an entrepreneurial venture j
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. 2,029 of these dyads refer to OSS entrepreneurial ventures while the remaining 4,526 refer to proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures.
Dependent Variables
VC quality. The quality of VC firms is quite heterogeneous (Sorensen, 2007) , with some VC firms having better screening, monitoring, and coaching ability because of greater investment experience. Accordingly, the first set of dependent variables measures the quality of VC investors through several proxies of their investment experience.
General experience ij is the cumulative number of rounds of investments in which VC firm i was involved prior to the investment in portfolio company j since 1980 13 . Since each VC round involves interaction with and evaluation of entrepreneurial ventures, in each round VC firms acquire knowledge and expertise regarding different aspects of the VC market and factors influencing success or failure of portfolio companies. This valuable knowledge and expertise has a direct positive impact on the screening, monitoring and coaching ability of the VC firm (Hsu, 2006) . In addition to learning, while participating in more rounds VC firms gain access to a larger network of potential suppliers, customers and executives, which in turn can be helpful to their portfolio companies (Sorensen, 2007) .
Industry experience ij is the ratio of the cumulative number of VC rounds in information technology entrepreneurial ventures in which VC firm i was involved to the total number of its VC rounds prior to the investment in portfolio company j. It captures the specialization of VC firms in information technology sector.
IPO experience ij measures the number of rounds the focal VC firm invested in entrepreneurial ventures which went public. An IPO is considered as the most successful exit for VC investments (Sorensen, 2007; Brander et al., 2002) . So this variable reflects the ability of VC firms to select high quality entrepreneurial ventures and/or to monitor, coach and position them after the investment (Cumming, Haslem, & Knill, 2011) .
Capital under management ij is calculated as the logarithm of the total amount invested by VC firm i in its portfolio companies in the 5 years prior to the first investment in company j. We use this 13 In order to calculate the general experience, industry specialization and IPO experience, we limited the sample to after 1980. Since till late 70s the VC market was very small and by change in policy at 1979, in which the U.S. Department of Labor clarified the "prudent man" stipulation in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act to allow pension funds to invest in VCs, the VC market grow dramatically (Gompers & Lerner 2001 ).
variable as a proxy for the ability of the focal VC firm to attract investment, which in turn is allegedly correlated with performance and reputation of the VC firm.
Connectedness ij ; it is well known that VC firms often syndicate their investments with other VC firms rather than investing alone, thereby creating a network of investment relationships with other VC firms. Hochberg et al. (2007) spread the investment risk, obtain better information on and a more accurate evaluation of the investee entrepreneurial venture, and provide it with more added value. We proxy the extent of syndication with the variable Syndication size, defined as the number of VC firms that co-invested in the same round (Lerner, 1994) .
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14 It is calculated formally, let pjk be the proportion of all paths linking actors j and k that pass through actor i. Actor i's betweenness is defined as Ʃpjk ∀ i ≠ j ≠ k. We also used Normalized degree of centrality. The variable determines the number of unique VC firms with which a VC firm has co-invested. Formally, Let bij = 1 if at least one syndication relationship exists between VCs i and j, and zero otherwise. VC i's degree then equals Ʃj bij (Hochberg et al., 2007) . The results are qualitatively similar. They are not reported in the paper and are available upon request. 15 Some previous studies on syndication measure the size of the syndicate with the number of VC firms that invested in the focal entrepreneurial venture (Sorenson & Stuart 2001; Cumming et al., 2011) . For robustness, in this paper we also used this definition of syndicate size (Syndication size 2). In addition, we use Syndication as dummy variable denoting syndicated investments (Brander et al., 2002) . In both cases, the results are similar. For brevity the results are not reported and are available upon request.
Independent Variables
The key independent variable in the empirical analysis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the portfolio company in the focal dyad is an OSS entrepreneurial venture and 0 if it is a proprietary software entrepreneurial venture (OSS).
Control Variables
In the empirical model, we control for characteristics of VC firms, entrepreneurial ventures, investment deal and the general economic environment. Characteristics of entrepreneurial venture. We also control for the stage in which it was at the first round of the investment (Early stage). Early stage investments are riskier (Gompers & Lerner, 1999 ) since entrepreneurial ventures usually lack a financial performance and require large effort to achieve success. The VCs and entrepreneurial ventures tend to cluster in special regions. In the North America majority of VC investments are in California and Massachusetts; hence, we control for geographical location of entrepreneurial ventures by two dummy variables of California and
Massachusetts which indicate whether they are located in California or Massachusetts. Several studies showed the role of patents in attracting VC investment (e.g. Mann & Sager, 2007) . When the information imperfection exists, the patents matter more as signal of quality (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013) .
For entrepreneurial ventures Patent measures the number of patent applications by entrepreneurial
venture j prior to the year in which it received the VC investment. Considering the application year instead of the grant year is justified since application is closer to innovation time and patenting procedure can take several months (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Tian & Wang, 2011) . We also control for the sub-sector of the software industry in which the entrepreneurial venture j operated, based on The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) provided by VentureXpert. We used three dummy variables which indicate whether entrepreneurial venture primary sub-sector is "Software Publishers", "Software Reproducing", or "Others".
[ Table 1 about here]
Characteristics of the deal. At the time of the first round of VC investment, information asymmetry is substantially greater than in correspondence with subsequent rounds. Indeed, the receipt of the first VC round gives to uninformed third parties a signal of the good quality of the focal entrepreneurial venture, thereby reducing the extent of the information asymmetries (Li, 2008) . First round ij is a dummy variable indicating that the focal dyad relates to the first round of funding. We also control for the age of entrepreneurial venture at the time of the VC investment (Age) 16 . Information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors are greater for younger firms that lack a track record (Sorensen, 2007) .
Finally, we consider several variables that reflect general market and macroeconomic conditions. Table 1 provides a summary statistics and definition of main variables. [ Table 2 about here]
Number of deals

Descriptive Statistics
Empirical Methodolody
In this study we focus on impact of collaboration with community of users on VC investment.
Respectively, we study quality of VC firms and terms of financing. In all models (j) is referring to entrepreneurial venture, (i) is representing VC firm.
VC quality. In this section we study impact of collaboration with community of users on quality of financing entrepreneurial ventures which they are able to acquire. Our analysis uses the following specification: 
Staging and syndication.
We also look at Monitoring of investment. Since the measures we used are positive integers, we use count models for analyzing monitoring of investment as following:
In this setting is representing two variables of number of rounds which funding was given to entrepreneurial ventures and syndication size. Given there is no high dispersion in our variables, the general assumptions underlying Poisson models, suggesting adopting Poisson model.
Alternatively we repeated all models with negative Binomial model in order to test robustness of our results to choice of models. The results are similar. All error terms are clustered around the entrepreneurial venture. Additionally, as an alternative for syndication size we use a dummy variable for existence of more than one VC firm in the deal; therefore we use a Logit model (The results are not reported for brevity and are available upon request). Table 3 reports the pair wise correlation of all variables in both models.
[ Table 3 about here] indicating whether entrepreneurial venture is in California or Massachusetts (others is omitted) and three dummy variables indicating the sub-sector of entrepreneurial venture and number of patent application prior funding. We also control for deal characteristics -whether the focal round is the first round of investment and venture age at the focal round of funding. Additionally, we control for macroeconomics variables which can impact VC investment. We include number of VC deals, the return on S&P 500 index, whether year of investment is in information technology bubble (1998) (1999) (2000) and a dummy for the years of the financial crisis (2007) (2008) (2009) Million dollars more capital under management and their betweenness centrality is 0.18% more which means they are about 30% more connected relative to the mean of sample.
RESULTS
VC Quality
[ Table 4 about here]
Regarding other variables, we can observe impact of patent on quality of VC firm. This is in line with findings which show impact of intellectual property rights on VC investment (Mann and Sager, 2007; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013 Massachusetts receive funding from higher quality VCs. In the bubble average quality of VC firms dropped since there was a surge in the number of entrepreneurial ventures , similarly in financial crisis the quality of VC firms increase since business opportunities and fund shrinks and only well respected
VCs are able to raise fund and invest.
Staging and Syndication
As it was argued above (H2a and H2b), in order to analyze the monitoring of VC investment we use two variables -the number of rounds that the VC invested in the entrepreneurial venture and syndicate size. Since the number of rounds is measured as total number of VC investment the venture received and is not time variant, we limit the analysis to only dyads in the first round of investment.
Therefore, the sample drops to 1,177 observations. For the analysis we use count models (Poisson)
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.
Empirical results in model 1 and 2 (Table 5) show OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive a greater number of rounds of VC fu nding. Since it was shown that OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive investment from higher quality VCs, one might argue the observed differences can be due to difference in risk tolerance of VCs with different qualities. In order to solve this problem in model 2
we control for VC quality (IPO experience), the results are robust. The coefficients in both models are statistically significant at 1% level. The coefficient in model 1 implies that OSS entrepreneurial ventures receive VC funding on average in 1.1 more rounds. In general, we find supportive evidence for H2a.
We do not observe significant differences in syndication size between OSS entrepreneurial ventures and proprietary ventures. The Model 3 and 4 (Table 5) demonstrates that there are no significant differences among OSS and proprietary ventures. We cannot claim any support for H2b.
[ Table 5 about here]
The control variables show entrepreneurial ventures that receive VC funding in older age, the numbers of rounds reduce. In software publishing and software reproduction sub sectors the number rounds increase. From model for syndication size we can see more patent applications are associated with larger syndicates. By increase in VC market size syndication size increases.
Robustness Checks
In order to check robustness of our results we run several different alternative analyses.
First, In the empirical setting we compared the entrepreneurial venture based on whether they develop products in collaboration with a community of users or not. In order to ensure that the nonrandomness of the sample does not bias our results, we employ propensity score matching, by using The results are available upon request.
Third, Because selecting to be OSS or proprietary for an entrepreneurial venture is not random, endogeneity may be a potential problem. We control for endogeneity by using instrumental variables (Vella & Verbeek, 1999 ) and Heckman treatment model in estimating VC. In both models ventures. This increases the uncertainty associated with the viability of OSS ventures, with the legitimacy of their business model, and with the potential for financial returns from such models. The challenges associated with OSS business models imply that the ventures that adopt such models will likely benefit much more from the value added services and certification effect that higher quality VCs can provide. We also argued that higher quality VCs have higher risk tolerance and are more likely to invest in OSS entrepreneurial ventures, which are associated with greater uncertainty, than their lower quality peers. We also argued that such VCs are more likely to use risk reduction strategies of staging and syndication.
Based on a sample of 514 software entrepreneurial ventures that received VC funding in 6,555 different deals, we find that software entrepreneurial venture that adopted an open business models receive funding from higher quality VCs. The result can be driven from two different explanations.
First, higher quality VCs possess resources and expertise that can help them tolerate higher risk and help them deal with the complexity of OSS business. Second, higher quality VCs are able to screen more efficiently and are more likely to select higher quality entrepreneurial ventures (Hsu, 2004) .
In case of staging, our results show that OSS entrepreneurial ventures on average receive more rounds of VC funding. Staging more frequently allows VCs to monitor entrepreneur efforts and actions, reduces agency cost and reduces downward risk by avoiding inefficient continuation through the exit option. The results can be explained by that the higher risk and complexity associated with investment in OSS entrepreneurial ventures. Higher uncertainty in this case increase likelihood of value of the exit option and consequently lead to more staging (Li, 2008) .
We did not find any significant differences in case of syndication size. A possible explanation for observing no differences in syndication size, despite expected higher risk and complexity associated with OSS entrepreneurial ventures, can be that syndication can increase coordination cost and lead to delay in decision making (Gompers & Lerner, 1999) which is more severe for OSS entrepreneurial ventures which have a complex business model. Due to lack of reliance on intellectual property rights, the speed to market is critical for OSS entrepreneurial ventures. Since syndication can cause delay in decision making process, it is possible that VCs are less inclined to syndicate to avoid delay in decision making.
One might argue the result can be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity (for example OSS entrepreneurial ventures are high quality ventures which are able to attract high quality VCs). In order to address this problem we take a number of steps. First, in robustness check we control for the exit as a quality proxy. In addition, we control for endogeneity using Heckman treatment model, instrumental variables and switching regressions. Finally we employ propensity score matching in order to control possible biases in the sample. The results are qualitatively similar.
In this study, we contribute to two streams of literature. First, a growing body of literature has examined open business models, with a special focus on OSS. The initial studies focused on understanding the motivation of contributors (e.g. Lerner & Tirole, 2002; von Hippel & von Krough, 2003; O'Mahony & Ferrero, 2007) .
Others have examined what determines introduction of open
source products by firms (Fosfuri et al., 2008; Wen et al., 2011) , the challenges and strategies for benefiting from open source communities (Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005; West & Gallagher, 2006; Bonaccorsi et al., 2006) , and the impact on performance of ventures (Piva et al., 2012; Stam, 2009 ). However, scholars have rarely explored the financing of firms involving in OSS (see Alexy & George, 2013 for an exception). Our study differs from Alexy and George (2013) shown that when the uncertainty about business prospects increases the value added services and certification effect of higher quality VCs play important role in success and survival of venture (Timmons & Bygrave, 1986; Sapienza & Timmons, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Hellmann & Puri, 2000; Tian & Wang 2011) . Consequently higher quality VC are more likely to invest in more uncertain business and industries (Petkova et al., 2013 ) not only because they can add more value but also because they have higher risk tolerance (Tian, Wang 2011) . In line with this argument we argued that because of the exacerbated uncertainty surrounding OSS business models, conditional on receiving VC financing, the quality of VC investors that such ventures receive financing from, is higher than quality of VCs that invest in proprietary software entrepreneurial ventures. Similarly, some shcolars have argued that the value of staging is positively correlated with uncertainty about the prospect of business (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008; Tian, 2011 
